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Abstract—Deep neural network based object detection has
become the cornerstone of many real-world applications. Along
with this success comes concerns about its vulnerability to
malicious attacks. To gain more insight into this issue, we propose
a contextual camouflage attack (CCA for short) algorithm to in-
fluence the performance of object detectors. In this paper, we use
an evolutionary search strategy and adversarial machine learning
in interactions with a photo-realistic simulated environment to
find camouflage patterns that are effective over a huge variety
of object locations, camera poses, and lighting conditions. The
proposed camouflages are validated effective to most of the state-
of-the-art object detectors.
I. INTRODUCTION
Object detection has become a crucial part for many appli-
cations, such as autonomous driving [1], law enforcement and
orbital surveillance [2], to name a few. The rapid development
of artificial intelligence (AI) and deep neural networks(DNNs)
in the past few years boost the advancement of this task.
However, state-of-the-art object detectors [3], [4], [5], [6]
heavily depend on convolutional neural networks (CNNs) [7]
which, unfortunately, have been shown vulnerable to adver-
sarial attack—an adversary which can manipulate the CNNs’
output by adding imperceptible perturbations to an input image
[8]. Moreover, some recent works also show an adversary can
even fool object detectors in the real world by adding small
distractions to physical objects [9], [10].
Unlike previous adversarial attack works, in this paper we
intend to attack object detectors’ performance by learning
a perturbation on the contextual object of the input image.
Our approach hinges on an evolution search strategy [11] for
the optimization of the non-differentiable objective function,
which involves a complex 3D environmental simulation when
mapping from an input (a camouflage pattern) to an output
(the object detection accuracy). The simulated output images
are shown in Fig. 1. Given a batch of vehicles and a collection
of simulated environments [12], our goal is to generate a
camouflage for one of the vehicle and influence the detectors’
performance on the other unpainted vehicles in those environ-
ments. To be noted, our algorithm is also different from the
classic patch-based adversarial attacks [13], [14]. Instead of
placing the patch in a random location within the image, we
directly change the appearance of the object to investigate the
effect on other object detection performance, which could be
more powerful and general for different scenarios.
Many steps in this procedure are like black-boxes to us.
Knowing the camouflage pattern, we are able to paint it onto
the vehicle, but we have no idea how to write out a differ-
entiable expression for the “painting function”. Similarly, we
can drive the vehicle with the painted camouflage to various
places in the environments and take pictures of the vehicle, but
we cannot write out a differentiable “photographing function”.
The list goes on. As a result, we have to explicitly deal with
the black-box steps.
A clone function is employed in [11] to approximate the
black-box steps. The authors propose to alternatively learn
the clone function and search for the camouflage using this
clone function. However, the quality of the camouflage highly
depends on the performance of this clone function. When the
two inter-dependent items are jointly learned, it is easy to
be trapped at a poor local optimum. Besides, the simulators
often introduce some randomness into the rendering procedure,
making the clone function actually a mis-specified model. In
this paper, we instead explicitly leverage the randomness of
the simulator, along with the unknown black-box steps in
the procedure from painting a camouflage onto a contextual
vehicle to the results of detecting the other vehicles within
the image. According to the evolution search strategy [11],
we are estimating the expected gradient of a distribution via
dense sampling the distribution. The gradient error, which is
caused by a noisy function, is naturally bounded during the
optimization by the reciprocal of the square root of the size
of the search distribution, thus eliminating the need for ad-
hoc steps such as repeated queries. Since we directly estimate
the expected gradient w.r.t the camouflage, there would not be
local minimum deadlock as mentioned in [12].
To sum up, we make the following contributions:
• We demonstrate that, for the first time, by learning a
camouflage on a contextual vehicle, we could attack the
detectors’ performance on the unpainted vehicles in the
same image. Our learned camouflage is validated to work
on all of the three state-of-the-art object detectors.
• We proposed a new method that jointly models the
transformation distribution and camouflage variations.
• In addition to the contextual adversarial attack, we
demonstrate the applicability of our CCA model to en-
hance the performance of object detectors.
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Fig. 1. YOLOv3 detection visualization of a Toyota Camry 2015 XLE with silver paint (a), random texture (b) and our learned camouflage (c) in the
simulation. Our camouflage successfully attacks the detector’s performance on the unpainted vehicles (framed by yellow boxes) compared with the random
texture and plain color.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we introduce some related works which aim
to defunctionalize CNNs. While other authors use adversarial
learning for purposes different from ours, such as extracting
private information [15], we narrow our scope to those that
aim to defunctionalize CNNs.
A. Adversarial Attack and Blackbox Optimization
Whether targeting a classification model or a detection
model, adversarial machine learning (AML) against CNNs has
seen great development since Szegedy et al. [16] discovered
that small perturbations could alter CNN predictions. A con-
siderable amount of recent AML literature [17], [18], [19],
[20] requires a target model to be transparent to calculate the
gradient, as knowing a numerical pathway between a perturba-
tion and a model prediction grants an enormous optimization
advantage. Such a pathway is not always available given that
a target model is often a blackbox in real attacks. Various
proposed blackbox attack methods rely solely on query and
target model output. Most of these are still based on gradient
descent. The difference lies in how they estimate a perturbation
gradient in the blackbox setting. ZOO [21] estimates it by
coordinate descent. [22] trained a substitute model to mimic
the target model behavior to obtain the gradient. [23], [24]
estimate it via an evolutionary strategy. [25] is based on
differential evolution. [12] shares the same task with us and
they choose to minimize an end-to-end clone network that is
trained to directly estimate score from camouflage.
B. Physical Adversarial Attack
One of the sub-areas of AML is to generalize it to the
physical dimension. This is challenging because training in
silico often results in poor generalization to real environments.
The first attempt was by [26] and they produced perturbations
that remain effective when printed on paper. [10] generalize
a perturbation to fool a classifier of real stop sign images.
However [27], [28] found that [10]’s perturbation do not work
on a real world detector. This is likely because detectors are
more robust than classifiers since detectors must detect objects
at multiple scales. Later, [19], [29] proposed perturbations that
could attack stop-sign detectors in the real-world. However,
all the aforementioned works are perturbing detectors of
stop signs, which are planar objects whose images, under
changes in camera geometry, are related by linear 2D projec-
tive transformations. This is in contrast to nonplanar objects
whose images, under changes in camera geometry, are related
by more complex range-dependent nonlinear transformations.
Perturbations are easily transformed via linear 2D projective
transformation without breaking the gradient chain between
the perturbation and the output score [30], [10]. Complex
nonlinear transformations, however, will require a dedicated
3D simulation, such as the one used in our paper, which breaks
the gradient chain and greatly complicates the optimization.
Besides, there are only 1983 stop sign instances in the training
split of MS-COCO [31]. Meanwhile, there are 43867 cars of
various appearance in it. Such a great amount and diversity
benefits vehicle detectors’ generalization capacity trained on
MS-COCO and makes it harder to fool.
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Fig. 2. The framework of proposed CCA algorithm.
III. APPROACH
A. Problem Statement
The framework of proposed algorithm is shown in Fig. 2.
There are mainly three phases in our algorithm, including
simulation, detection and evolution. Let c denote a vehicle
camouflage pattern represented by an RGB image. When c
has been painted onto the surface of a vehicle in a tiled style,
state-of-the-art object detectors would completely or partially
fail to detect/classify the vehicle regardless of observation
angles, distances and environments. In this context, we aim
to determine whether it is possible to create a camouflage
pattern c, being painted on a given vehicle, could mislead
detectors to make incorrect detection/classification on the other
vehicles (without camouflage) in the same scene. After in-
putting the simulated images into detectors and outputting the
detection results, we conduct the optimization of the proposed
camouflage from two aspects, namely the attack performance
of the camouflage on detectors and search distribution of the
camouflage. The workflow of proposed contextual adversarial
attack is shown in Algorithm 1. We describe our approach to
implementing the proposed loss function in Section III-B. In
Section III-C we outline the architecture of our evolutionary
model to generate the optimal camouflage pattern.
B. Loss Function Designation
Given a camouflage pattern c, represented by a 16 × 16
RGB image, we would like to convert it to a photo that
looks like real. We denote t as the transformation, specifically
including tiling and painting the c onto a vehicle, moving the
vehicle to a location in an environment and at last taking
Algorithm 1 Framework of the proposed method
Require: Object detector; Vehicle camouflage painter; Learn-
ing rate, α
Ensure: Optimal camouflage pattern, c;
1: Randomly initialize vehicle camouflage pattern c;
2: repeat
3: Painting the c onto a vehicle for each t in τ with
vehicle camouflage painter;
4: Calculating the mean score Et∼T S˜t(c) with object
detector;
5: Calculating the gradient ∇cS˜t(c);
6: Updating the search distribution Zc;
7: Updating c according to ∇cEt∼T S˜t(c) with learning
rate α;
8: until Et∼T S˜t(c) no longer decreases
9: return c
a photo of that vehicle from a certain angle and distance.
After transformation, we will have an image with a vehicle
covered by a camouflage texture in it. We suppose that there
are n vehicles in the generated image except for the one
with camouflage. Then, we could denote the scores of the
vehicles without camouflage as Sit(c) ∈ [0, 1], i = 1, 2, 3...n.
The overeaching idea of our algorithm is to find an optimal
camouflage, such that the mean score of Sit(c) is low:
argmin
c
1
n
n∑
i=1
Sit(c) (1)
For the concern about the complexity of the physical world,
following [32], we construct a batch of transformations T
for each learning procedure, involving the factors of different
lighting condition, and distance and viewpoint changes. Thus,
by minimizing the score in expectation, we have the following
optimization problem:
argmin
c
Et∼T S˜t(c), (2)
where S˜t(c) is the mean score of Sit(c). And then we could
have eq. 2 as:
argmin
c
1
|T |
∑
t∈T
S˜t(c) (3)
C. Evolutionary Model
In this section, we aim to optimize a flattened c during
the training process. Specifically, it contains two major com-
ponents. First one is the performance over various trans-
formations. Besides, we also want to optimize c’s search
distribution’s members’ performance. Suppose Zc is the search
distribution of camouflage c, then, for a fixed transformation
t, our goal is to optimize:
min
c
Eζ∼Zc S˜t(ζ) (4)
Inspired by [33], we design our gradient as:
∇cS˜t(c) ≈ ∇cEζ∼Zc S˜t(ζ)
≈ 1
λ
λ∑
k=1
S˜t(ζk) · ∇clogpi(ζk|c),
(5)
where λ is the number of samples from the distribution.
However, different from the problem mentioned in [11], our
optimization has a constraint of [0, 255] because of the image
feature of c. In our case, we propose to use a truncated
multivariate normal distribution N[0:255] to bound both c and
the search radius without extra hassle.
Instead of directly minimizing ES˜t(c), we choose to min-
imize the binary cross-entropy between it and zero as shown
eq. 6:
H[0, S˜t(c)] = −log(1− S˜t(c)) (6)
During optimization, we assume the scores of Zc are nor-
mally distributed given that Zc itself is normally distributed.
In this case, by normalizing Et∼T S˜t(c) into standard scores
using βt, we could have:
βk =
Et∼T S˜t(ζk)− 1λ
∑λ
k=1 Et∼T S˜t(ζk)
std
{
Et∼T S˜t(ζn)|1 ≤ n ≤ λ
}
Et∼T S˜t(c) =
1
|T |
∑
t∈T
S˜t(c)
(7)
Then, we arrive at our normalized gradient:
∇cEt∼T S˜t(c)
≈ ∇cE(t,ζ)∼(T ,N[0:255](c,σ2))S˜t(ζ)
≈ 1
λ · |T |
∑
t∈T
λ∑
k=1
βk ·H[0, S˜t(ζk)] · ∇clogpi(ζk|c)
=
1
λ · |T | · σ2
∑
t∈T
λ∑
k=1
βk ·H[0, S˜t(ζk)] · (ζk − c),
(8)
Then, the gradient approximation in eq. 8 is used to per-
form gradient descent. We choose to perform simple gradient
descent which is:
c← c− α · ∇cEt∼T S˜t(c) (9)
where α is the learning rate. Then we update c until Et∼T S˜t(c)
no longer decreases.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we present the experiment results to demon-
strate the effectiveness of the proposed method.
A. Dataset
In this work, we use the Unreal Engine to build a simula-
tion environment based on the real downtown environment.
Specifically, we build different kind of cars, roads, traffic
signals in the simulated environment. To obtain valid data for
training and testing, we sequentially camouflage and place a
professionally modeled Camry 2015 XLE in different locations
in the environments. Also, 36 locations are sampled along the
roads in the environment, 18 of which for training and the
remaining 18 for testing. At each location, we record RGB
images and groundtruth of the vehicle and the surrounding
area from 20 fixed camera orientations. We manually label
all the groundtruth of vehicles into two categories: the one
carrying the camouflage and the normal ones. These images
and groundtruths are then sent to the detector for evaluation.
Inspired by [12], in our experiments, we set the resolution of
camouflage to be 16× 16.
B. Implementation Details
For evaluation, we use two MS-COCO [31] pretrained
detectors in our experiments: YOLOv3 [5] and Mask-RCNN
[3]. Mask-RCNN is currently one of the hallmark detectors for
object detection in terms of detection performance. YOLOv3,
on the other hand, balances performance with detection speed.
We use the YOLOv3-SPP variant, which has the best detection
performance among the YOLOv3 family.
Also, we apply three detection metrics as the indicators
of performance: detection confidence, mean Intersection over
Union (mIoU) [34] and precision@0.5 (P@0.5). The detection
confidence is the mean value of the scores of the detected cars
in different scenes. The Intersection over Union IoU between
predicted bounding box Bp and ground truth bounding box
Bgt is defined by IoU =
Bp∩Bgt
Bp∪Bgt [34]. In our experiments,
we use the best IoU achieved among all vehicle bounding
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Fig. 3. Training process of our learned camouflage against state-of-the-art object detectors. The x axis represents the iteration time of the training, and the
y axis represents the mean value of the detection scores of the unpainted vehicles in all scenes. (a) Training process against YOLOv3; (b) Training process
against MaskRCNN; (c) Training process against FCOS.
Camouflages Training set Testing setDetection
confidence(%) mIOU(%) P@0.5(%)
Detection
confidence(%) mIOU(%) P@0.5(%)
Basic colors 55.87 49.93 65.71 57.10 51.92 63.23
Random camouflage 55.02 48.78 63.70 54.06 48.57 61.77
Ours 51.35 47.25 62.35 53.25 48.15 60.48
TABLE I
YOLOV3 DETECTION PERFORMANCE AMONG BASELINES AND PROPOSED CCA CAMOUFLAGE.
Camouflages Training set Testing setDetection
confidence(%) mIOU(%) P@0.5(%)
Detection
confidence(%) mIOU(%) P@0.5(%)
Basic colors 48.48 46.61 49.78 48.87 47.54 48.19
Random camouflage 48.90 47.08 49.61 48.79 47.46 47.87
Ours 46.82 45.54 47.77 47.97 46.91 46.71
TABLE II
MASKRCNN DETECTION PERFORMANCE AMONG BASELINES AND PROPOSED CCA CAMOUFLAGE.
Camouflages Training set Testing setDetection
confidence(%) mIOU(%) P@0.5(%)
Detection
confidence(%) mIOU(%) P@0.5(%)
Basic colors 34.44 38.96 46.46 34.02 39.48 46.31
Random camouflage 34.08 38.75 45.78 33.77 39.36 46.39
Ours 33.02 37.81 44.83 33.60 38.53 45.42
TABLE III
FCOS DETECTION PERFORMANCE AMONG BASELINES AND PROPOSED CCA CAMOUFLAGE.
box predictions for the image as its IoU. The mIoU is the
averaged IoU across all images at all locations that are being
reported. The P@0.5 is the percentage of images that have IoU
larger than 0.5. This metric is used in the PASCAL detection
challenge [34], which considers a detection prediction to be
successful if its IoU is greater than 0.5.
For a thorough evaluation, inspired by [12], we compare
our results with two baselines to validate the effective of the
proposed camouflage, as shown in Fig. 1. The first one is
conducted by painting the central vehicle with six real vehicle
colors (red, black, silver, grey, blue, and white) and compute
the mean value of the detection metrics. Another one is that
we generate 5 random camouflages with the same resolution
of the learned camouflage and report the mean values of the
detection metrics for comparison.
C. Against Object Detectors
In this section, we present the performance of our learned
camouflage and the baselines against several state-of-the-art
detectors, including YOLOv3, Mask-RCNN and FCOS in the
downtown environment.
The learning process of our CCA camouflage against
YOLOv3 is shown in Fig. 3 (a). In the training, we set the
scores by computing the mean value of the detection scores
of all the unpainted vehicles. From Fig. 3 (a), we can easily
observe that the detection scores of the vehicles decreases
under the proposed learning algorithm, which demonstrates
the effectiveness of the evolution search strategy we applied in
CCA. To further validate the effectiveness of the learned cam-
ouflage, experiments were conducted to compare the proposed
camouflage to other baselines: painting basic colors or random
camouflage on the context vehicle. As shown in Table I, our
（a）
（b）
（c）
（d）
Fig. 4. Grad-CAM of YOLOv3 on images with random camouflage ((a)\(c)) and CCA camouflage ((b)\(d)). Left column is original images, and right column
is Grad-CAM of images. In Grad-CAMs, pixels’ color closer to red means more relevant to the detected category ”car”, and vice versa. The attentions on
unpainted vehicles (framed by yellow boxes) are reduced with the proposed CCA camouflage being painted on the central vehicles.
method outperforms baselines over all the three metrics on
both training data and testing data. This supports our argument
that we could misled object detector by only changing a part
of the context.
We present the training process and camouflages’ perfor-
mance against MaskRCNN in Fig. 3(b) and Table II. Similar to
its performance against YOLOv3, our learnd CCA camouflage
outperforms baseline colors and random camouflages on both
training and testing data. Furthermore, we can draw the same
observation from the experiment results of FCOS reported in
Fig. 3(c) and Table III. All the reported experiments show
the effectiveness of CCA on attacking state-of-the-art object
detectors.
D. Qualitative Analysis
To validate the proposed CCA camouflage’s influence on
object detectors, we visualize the Grad-CAM [35] maps of
the samples with our learned camouflage and random cam-
ouflage. Since the Grad-CAM shows the gradient heatmap
of the classification score scalar w.r.t. the input, it could
help us to identify the image regions most relevant to the
particular category. Fig. 4 shows two visualization examples,
and each of them presents the detection result of YOLOv3
and corresponding Grad-CAM map. To be noted, YOLOv3
is a multi-scale detector and there are three layers of features
with different sizes in the output. Considering of the resolution
（a）
（b）
Fig. 5. Grad-CAM of YOLOv3 on images with random camouflage and
CCA camouflage. (a) is image with random camouflage; (b)is image with
learned CCA camouflages. Left row shows original images, and right row
shows Grad-CAM of images. Attentions on the unpainted vehicle (framed by
yellow box) are transferred to the camouflaged vehicle(framed by blue box)
after training.
of the input and the objects’ size in the images, we use
the nearest convolution layer to the 13 × 13 feature layer of
YOLOv3 as the penultimate layer and output the attention map
of strategy ’car’ in each detection. For a fair comparison, we
output the absolute value instead of the normalized value of
the gradient scores of the feature map in our experiments. As
expected, in the images with the proposed CCA camouflaged
vehicle (Fig. 4 (b)(d)), the unpainted vehicles gain much lower
attention than in the scenes with a random camouflaged vehicle
(Fig. 4 (a)(c)). This observation further explains and validates
our assumption that we could reduce the object detectors’
performance on certain objects by learning a contextual cam-
ouflage.
Fig. 5 shows another example, in which the detector’s
attention is completely shifted from the front unpainted vehicle
to the vehicle in the back. This case also proves the the
proposed CCA camouflage’s capability of influencing the
detector’s performance on the objects that without camouflages
painted on them.
E. Extensions on Contextual Adversarial Attack
So far we have shown the effectiveness of our learned CCA
camouflage on attacking object detector with the evolution
strategy. Intuitively, we come up with the assumption that it
should also be possible that we influence the detector with an
opposite effected camouflage and increase the attention of the
vehicles.
Here, we confirm that by experiments. In order to gain
the opposite rewards, we reset the loss function proposed in
Section III-B as:
argmin
c
− 1|T |
∑
t∈T
S˜t(c). (10)
Then we apply the evolution strategy proposed in Section
III-C to figure out the potential positive affect of the CCA
camouflage on object detectors. Fig. 6 shows the training
process of the YOLOv3 and MaskRCNN. It shows that we
can effectively improve the performance of the models with a
learned contextual camouflage. Detection results comparison
also proves this as shown in Table IV. The learned CCA
camouflage outperforms the basic colors and random cam-
ouflage both on training and testing dataset. That means we
could influence the object detectors’ performance by not only
attacking them but also enhancing them with the proposed
CCA pattern.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we first investigate the problem of learning
contextual adversarial object camouflage to attack vehicle
detectors, such as YOLOv3, MaskRCNN and FCOS. We pro-
pose an evolutionary based algorithm to learn highly effective
camouflages by interacting with a photo-realistic simulation.
Our proposed CCA algorithm not only shows the effectiveness
of attacking the state-of-the-art object detectors, but also shows
its capability to enhance the detectors. The next phase of our
work is to generalize the camouflages from simulation to the
real world. Both adversarial domain adaptation and domain
randomization seem to be promising approaches for this step.
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